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1,

Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24, Appellants
Richard Taylor, John Merendino, Mark Levy, and Imaging Specialists,
Inc. ("ISI") (collectively, "Guarantors") hereby reply to the brief
filed by Otsuka Electronics USA, Inc. ("Otsuka").
I.

INTRODUCTION
Guarantors have filed their Appellate Brief in which they

assert that the court below erroneously granted summary judgment in
favor of Otsuka and erroneously denied Guarantors' Motion for Leave
to Amend Answer and Add Counterclaim.

Otsuka's brief asserts that

the court below correctly entered these orders and a corresponding
judgment. However, Otsuka's brief contains numerous errors of law,
and attempts to resolve material issues of fact which are properly
within the realm of a trier of fact.
Otsuka's analysis is erroneous in the following respects: (1)
Otsuka incorrectly asserts that the Guarantors did not properly
allege claims of fraud and a breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing, and did not raise material issues of fact with regard
to those theories; (2) Otsuka misapplies the holding of this Court
in Walter E. Heller Western, Inc. v. U.S. Rock Wool Co., 787 P.2d
898 (Utah App. 1990), and mistakenly concludes that defenses to a
contract

never

apply to

concurrently

executed

guaranties;

(3)

Otsuka erroneously states that the Forbearance Agreement waived
affirmative defenses; (4) Otsuka misconstrues the Utah

Supreme

Court's holding in Ona Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. n t h Avenue Corp.,
850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993); and (5) in arguing that a release waives
I

existing claims of fraud, Otsuka relies on cases outside this
jurisdiction which either (a) do not stand for this proposition; or
(b) contradict the law of this state set forth by the Utah Supreme
Court in Oner.
For the reasons set forth in the Brief of Appellants and in
this Reply Brief, the Order and Judgment of the court below should
be reversed and this case should be remanded for a trial on the
merits.
II.

IN THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW, GUARANTORS ADEQUATELY ALLEGED CLAIMS
FOR FRAUD AND BREACH OF THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
DEALING, AND RAISED MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT IN RESPONSE TO
OTSUKA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Contrary to Otsuka's argument

Guarantors

sufficiently

proceedings below.

alleged

As asserted

(Appellee's Brief at 3 3-44),
claims

for

relief

in

the

in Appellants' Brief at 4-13,

significant issues existed with regard to the Otsuka MRI, including
FDA issues and internal problems, and Otsuka knew that it could not
deliver the Otsuka MRI or should have known that it could not make
good faith representations that it could deliver.
Consequently,

Otsuka's representations

that

(R.000443-444).

it would

sign

the

February 1993 Lease Agreement, and therefore could deliver the
Otsuka

MRI, were

misrepresentations

of

fact.

(R.000442-443,

000447-449). Also, Otsuka's failure to reveal the circumstances of
the FDA problems and its internal deliberations constitute material
omissions of fact.

(R.000443-445, 000447-449, 000452-453).

In

reliance on Otsuka's misrepresentations and omissions, Wasatch and
2

the Guarantors executed agreements, entered into construction loan
contracts, and then executed an amended agreement and eventually
the Forbearance Agreement.

(R.000450).

Guarantors also raised these genuine issues of material fact
in their Memorandum in Opposition to Otsuka's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

(Appellants' Brief at 13, R.000471-481).l

Plaintiff's statements in footnote 6, page 40, are simply
inexplicable. Guarantors' proposed Amended Answer and Counterclaim
was incorporated as Exhibit A to the Motion for Leave to Amend
Answer and Add Counterclaim, filed October 6, 1995, which was
signed by Guarantors' counsel pursuant to Rule 11. (R.000425-455).
Documents attached to pleadings filed with the court are subject to
the strictures of Rule 11. See Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770
P.2d 163, 170-172 (Utah App. 1989) (sanctions were appropriate
where the wrong document was attached to a complaint, because
counsel was obligated under Rule 11 to make a reasonable inquiry
regarding the attached document before filing it); Utah Rule Civ.
P. 11 (pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by an affidavit except when specifically provided by rule or statute). Thus
pursuant to Rule 11 Guarantors' counsel certified to the court
below that the proposed Amended Answer and Counterclaim was wellgrounded in fact. Guarantors could not formally file the Amended
Answer and Counterclaim with the court because the court denied the
motion to amend and add the counterclaim.
Guarantors also filed on October 6, 1995: Defendants' CrossMotion for Summary Judgment (R.000462-000464) , and Defendants'
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
(R.000465-491), which were supported by Affidavits of Guarantors
Richard Taylor (R.000498-502), John Merendino (R.000580-583), and
Mark Levy (R.000594-597) pursuant to Utah Rule Civ. P. 56(e); and
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend
Answer and Add Counterclaim (R,000456-464) . The memoranda filed by
Guarantors on October 6, 1995, and the proposed Amended Answer and
Counterclaim, each assert that plaintiff committed fraud and
breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
In order to
avoid a wholesale repetition of facts in and a duplication of
exhibits to each of these documents (already in excess of 22 0
pages), the documents filed on October 6, 1995 were crossreferenced to and supported by each other, including the
Guarantors' Affidavits. (R.000426, 000457-458, 000463).
3

Furthermore,

what

Otsuka

inaccurately

characterizes

as

"erroneous, unsubstantiated and unsworn assumptions" regarding the
FDA issues (Appellee's Brief at 43) are largely in the form of
Otsuka's own letters and internal memoranda.

The February 1, 1993

letters to Barnes West County Hospital and DeKalb Resonance Center
state that "there may be an issue with the FDA regarding the
precise status" of the MRI machines and that Otsuka was "required,
in the interim, to halt all human scanning.. ."

(R.000645-655).

Otsuka's February 5, 1993 letter to the FDA referenced a conference
call with the FDA which "confirmed that Otsuka Electronics had

Finally, contrary to plaintiff's puzzling assertions, the
citations in Guarantors' Appellate Brief at 12-13 clearly set forth
the references to Guarantors' Affidavits at R.000498-502, 000580583, and 000594-597, which support the assertions of fraud and
breach of the good faith duty made in the October 6, 1995
documents:
Otsuka represented that it would sign the February Lease
Agreement and failed to disclose that it was not signed
(R.000499, 000581-582, 000595-596);
In reliance on Otsuka's representations that it would sign the
February Lease Agreement (which provided for the delivery of
an Otsuka MRI), Richard Taylor entered into loan agreements on
behalf of Wasatch, ISI, and himself personally (R.000499-500);
Otsuka failed to disclose the FDA audit, the FDA's conclusion
that Otsuka had committed numerous violations of FDA
regulations, or that Otsuka had made an internal decision not
to deliver Otsuka MRI systems (R.000500-502, 000581-582,
000595-597);
Otsuka's misrepresentations and omissions regarding the
February Lease Agreement, the FDA issues, and Otsuka's
internal decision not to ship the MRI induced reliance by
Guarantors, who would have terminated business dealings with
plaintiff and would not have entered into any of the agreements had they known of these issues (R.000499-502, 000581583, 000596-597).

4

directed each of its two investigational sites...to stop all
scanning

activities

using

humans until

further

notice,11 and

included copies of the February 4, 1993 correspondence to DeKalb
and Barnes.2

(R.000656).

Despite Otsuka's attempts to minimize

the significance of these letters with the testimony of Kenneth
Dennison and Dale Grant, Appellee's Brief at 42-43, Otsuka's own
words in these letters indicate that there was obviously some
problem with the FDA necessitating a cessation of human scanning,
rather than simply "internal procedures,11 thus raising a factual
dispute.
Moreover, Otsuka does not even attempt to address the internal
memorandum by T. Michael Henderson dated February 4, 1993 (one week
before Wasatch and the Guarantors executed the agreements), which
states "If the creek don't rise (and the FDA doesn't cause them to
choke) we should have another deal done next week.
start construction —

And they will

I like that stage of the deal."

(R.000478,

Addendum to Appellants' Brief). Regardless how long Otsuka ceased
human scanning, Otsuka's own documents indicate it knew that the
ongoing FDA issues created obstacles which would destroy a milliondollar deal.

2

In Addendum 1 to Appellee's Brief, Statement of Undisputed but
Immaterial Facts, Otsuka fails to address the February 5, 1993
letter to the FDA or explain why Otsuka needed to confirm to the
FDA that it had directed the investigational sites and the Fort
Collins site to stop all human scanning.
5

Otuska

argues

misunderstanding

that

the

FDA

issue

consisted

of

a

mere

as to whether Otsuka was subject to the good

manufacturing practices as defined in the FDA regulations at 21
C.F.R. Part 820.
1-8, 13-14).

(Appellee's Brief at 42-43 and Addendum 1 at 55

Otsuka cites the March 2, 1993 letter to Gary Dean,

FDA Director of Compliance Branch, in which general counsel Jean
Macheledt attempted to explain Otsuka's position.

(Addendum 1 to

Appellee's Brief at 5 8) . However, Otsuka fails to address the May
17, 1993 Warning Letter from the FDA, in which the FDA acknowledges
this March 2 letter as well as correspondence from Otsuka dated
April 22 and 23 and Otsuka's statements during an April 5, 199 3
meeting.

(R.000657-658) .

Notwithstanding Otsuka's explanations,

the May 17, 1993 letter from the FDA reiterated the findings of the
January 11-February 3, 1993 audit that the Otsuka MRI failed to
comply with FDA regulations.

The letter also stated:

We expect your devices, prior to being used commercially
and clinically, to be in total compliance with all
sections of the Act, which include, but are not limited
to, IDE, 510fk), and good manufacturing practices.
We request that you take prompt action to correct these
deviations. Failure to promptly correct these deviations may
result in regulatory action being initiated by the Food and
Drug Administration without further notice.
These actions
include seizure and/or injunction.
(R.000658, emphasis added).
Guarantors submit that Otuska knew, at the time of the January
11-February 3, 1993 audit, including the problems with the FDA in

6

early February3, that the Otsuka MRI could not be used commercially
or clinically until Otsuka complied with "all sections of the Act"
including "510 (k) and good manufacturing practices,11

The FDA

problems were clearly relevant and material to the transaction, and
thus Otsuka had

a duty to reveal them

to Wasatch

and the

Guarantors. Rather, Otsuka chose to negotiate with Wasatch for the
sale of the Otsuka MRI and encourage Wasatch to enter into the
transaction, knowing that Wasatch would procure construction loans
and begin construction4, without disclosing these obstacles.
Otsuka coyly contends that "[a]lthough it was Otsuka's position
that the Upgraded Model was not subject to GMPs, Otsuka determined
that it would not ship any units of the Upgraded Model until it had
met its own internal manufacturing standards."
Appellees7 Brief at 5 9.

Addendum 1 to

Otsuka never attempts to explain what

3

The May 17, 1993 letter from the FDA refers only to the
January 11-February 3, 1993 audit, and there were no intervening
on-site audits.
4

Otuska asserts, Appellee's Brief at 40 fn.6, that the Otsuka
MRI could not be shipped because Wasatch did not have an
institutional review board (IRB) in place. There is no evidence
that an IRB is required to accept delivery of an MRI classified as
investigational.
In light of Otsuka's delays (and eventual
admission that it could not deliver the Otsuka MRI), it was
entirely reasonable for Wasatch to forgo the expense of instituting
an IRB, having already leased the MRI facility and committed to
large construction loans, until delivery of the Otsuka MRI was
imminent.
Further, the March 10, 1993 letter from Dale Grant indicated
that the Otsuka MRI would not ship until late May. (R.000631).
Wasatch obtained the building permit on April 12, 1993, in reliance
on the February 1993 Lease Agreement, leaving five or six weeks for
construction before that shipment.
7

caused the "internal manufacturing problems" or why the Otsuka MRI
did

not

satisfy

Otsuka's

"internal

manufacturing

standards."

Guarantors submit that these amorphous assertions are not factually
supported, are highly coincidental with the FDA action5, and are
5

Despite Otsuka's attempt to establish that the FDA issues were
irrelevant, Addendum 1 to Appellee's Brief, the undisputed facts
indicate that the FDA issues were highly synchronized and
intertwined with Otsuka's internal decision making:
It is undisputed that Otsuka represented that it would ship
the Otsuka MRI to Wasatch in January, 1993; the FDA commenced
the audit of Otsuka in January, 1993, and the MRI was not
shipped (R.000630, Addendum 1 to Appellee's Brief at 5 7 ) ;
It is undisputed that as of one week before Wasatch and the
Guarantors executed the agreements, Otsuka believed that the
FDA issues could ruin the deal with Wasatch (R.000478,
Addendum to Appellants' Brief);
It is undisputed that on February 1, 1993, during the FDA
audit, Otsuka directed Barnes and DeKalb to cease human
scanning and that on February 5, 1993 Otsuka confirmed to the
FDA that it had done so (R.000654-656);
It is undisputed that the FDA cleared the 510(k)#2 application
in December, 1993; shortly thereafter, Otsuka's "internal
manufacturing controls" were satisfied, Otsuka resumed
shipment of the MRI, and human scans were first performed
under 510(k)#2 clearance in late December, 1993 (Addendum 1 to
Appellee's Brief at «[ 14, R. 000721-722) .
Moreover, it is undisputed from Otsuka's own documents and the
testimony of Otsuka's employees that:
At some point in 1993, Otsuka instructed its salespeople not
to promote or sell the Otsuka MRI (R.000642-643, 000634-635);
Otsuka believed the FDA problems would cause Wasatch "to
choke" (R.000478, Addendum to Appellants' Brief);
Otsuka never believed it had an obligation to deliver the
Otsuka MRI to Wasatch (R.000609-613).
It appears that despite Otsuka's protestations that "internal
controls" were the reason for the decision not to ship, it was
actually the FDA issues which arose in early 1993, before Wasatch
and the Guarantors executed the February documents, which prompted
Otsuka to discontinue shipping the Otsuka MRI until 510(k)#2
clearance was obtained. These are factual issues to be determined

8

meant to divert attention from Otsuka7s failure to reveal the fact
or very high probability that Otsuka could not deliver the Otsuka
MRI when it negotiated the lease agreement with Wasatch.

Even if

Otsuka did experience manufacturing problems such problems would be
irrelevant if an FDA mandate precluded production and delivery. At
the very least, these are factual questions to be decided by a
trier of fact.
Otsuka

further

asserts

that

no

fraud

existed

because

Guarantors alleged that the inability to deliver occurred in March
or April of 1993.

(Appellee's Brief at 38.)

This is incorrect.

Guarantors alleged that it was the FDA action, which commenced in
mid-January 1993, which "impeded or rendered impossible Otsuka's
ability to sign and perform under the February
(R.000443-444).

1993 Lease."

Even if Otsuka made an internal decision not to

ship Otsuka MRIs in March or April 1993, this does not preclude a
finding of fraud. Fraud occurs when a person makes representations
which are known to be false or are made recklessly with the
knowledge

that

representations.

there

are

insufficient

grounds

to make

such

Pace v. Parrish 247 P.2d 273, 274-75 (1952).

Further, a seller has a duty to represent fairly and accurately the
material elements of property sold when such elements are not
easily ascertainable by the buyer and materially affect the value
of the property. Ong, 850 P.2d at 454. Materiality of information

by a trier of fact.
9

omitted is a question of fact for a jury. Ong, 850 P.2d at 454 fn.
25.6
Serious questions regarding the Otsuka MRI existed in January
and early February 1993, yet Otsuka continued to negotiate the
deal, and represented that it would execute the February Lease
Agreement.

As of February 4, 1993, the date of T. Michael

Henderson's memorandum, Otsuka knew that the FDA issues would ruin
the deal with Wasatch if the issues were revealed.

A jury could

reasonably conclude that based on the FDA's audit, conclusions, and
warnings, Otsuka's "decision" not to ship the Otsuka MRI was merely
a formality, and that Otsuka's representations and omissions were
either intentionally fraudulent or made recklessly.
Wasatch and the Guarantors agreed to accept a Siemens machine
because at the time Otsuka finally announced it could not ship the
Otsuka MRI, Wasatch had a lease on the MRI facility, had committed
to substantial loans, and had begun construction on the MRI

6

Otsuka's discussion with regard to Conzelmann v. Northwest
poultry & Dairy Products Co. , 225 P.2d 757 (Ore. 1950), must be
qualified by these considerations. (Appellee's Brief at 36-39).
In light of the elements of fraud in Utah, and the requirement that
a seller reveal hidden and material facts, Otsuka had to reveal the
facts concerning the Otsuka MRI which rendered Otsuka's ability to
deliver substantially more difficult or improbable. There is no
requirement, as Otsuka implies, Appellee's Brief at 37, that Otsuka
have known with certainty that it could not deliver.
Furthermore, Otsuka's duty to reveal these facts extended past
the November 1992 Quotation, throughout the subsequent period
during which the transaction was negotiated, documents were
executed (February and August 1993), and the Guarantors procured
financing in reliance on the transaction.
10

facility.

The point of this case is that after considerable delay

and expense

(R.000484, 000499-500), Wasatch and the Guarantors

ended up with an MRI machine which was more expensive than and had
different technical specifications from the Otsuka MRI (R.000176188) , and which they did not initially bargain for.

If this result

had been the product of Otsuka,s good faith efforts to provide an
Otsuka MRI, efforts which were frustrated because of unforeseeable
manufacturing problems, the Guarantors would not be pursuing these
claims and defenses.

The Guarantors are pressing this appeal

because of evidence that Otsuka either knew that it could not
deliver an Otsuka MRI, or had good reason to know that it could not
deliver,

rendering

inception.7

the

entire

transaction

a

sham

from

its

Otsuka should not be able to avoid these claims and

defenses simply because it was successful in persuading Wasatch and
7

Otsuka contends that the Motion to Amend takes a "ridiculous11
and "absurd" position because Otsuka would not want to finance its
competitors machine.
That result was not necessarily Otsuka's
objective. Although establishing a motive is not an element of
fraud, the Guarantors alleged that Otsuka desired to enter into the
transaction with Wasatch in order to develop a long-term
relationship with the University of Utah.
(R.000440, 000474).
Further, businesses and salespeople are often zealous. Otsuka most
likely pressed the deal with Wasatch with the hope or expectation
that the FDA and internal issues would be resolved in time to
deliver the Otsuka MRI.
While Otsuka would have the Court believe that financing the
Siemens MRI was a heroic measure, Appellee's Brief at 45-4 6, the
Guarantors submit that Otsuka took such action because the issues
preventing the shipment of the Otsuka MRI did not clear up, and
Otsuka knew it would be sued if the FDA issues came to light.
Further, the financial documents in this action demonstrate that
Otsuka stood to earn hundreds of thousands of dollars by financing
the Siemens transaction. (R.000131, 000175).
11

the Guarantors to accept another machine, and then to waive all
unknown claims, all the while remaining silent with regard to the
issues surrounding the Otsuka MRI.
On a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must assume
the facts asserted by the opposing party are true, and may not
grant summary judgment unless it is clear that the opposing party
could not prevail as a matter of law,
v.

Fitzgerald,

671 P.2d

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Hall

224, 226' (Utah 1983).

The

numerous

questions of material fact demonstrate that the court below could
not properly grant summary judgment for Otsuka and deny Guarantors'
motion to amend.

The rulings in this case should be reversed and

the case remanded for trial.
III. OTSUKA'S FRAUDULENT AND
NULLIFIES THE GUARANTIES

BAD

PAITH

BEHAVIOR/

AS

ALLEGED,

Otsuka cites Walter E. Heller Western, Inc. v. U.S. Rock Wool
Co. f

787 P.2d

898

(Utah App. 1990),

for the proposition that

defenses pertaining to a primary obligor are inapplicable to a
absolute guaranty.

(Appellee's Brief at 19) . Otsuka's interpreta-

tion of Helller Western is overbroad.

The defendants in Heller

Western executed guaranties concurrently with a loan contract.
Defendants
plaintiff's
contract.
that

later
bad

sought
faith

to

avoid

conduct

in

the

guaranties

performing

under

Heller Western, 787 P.2d at 899-901.

although

such

bad

faith

behavior

may

be

based
the

on
loan

This Court held
a

defense

to

enforcement of the loan contract, it was not pertinent to liability
12

under the previously executed guaranties. Heller Western, 787 P. 2d
at 901.
By contrast, Guarantors in the present case have alleged that
Otsuka committed fraud and breached the good faith duty in the
negotiation and execution of the various agreements, including the
guaranties.

(R.000447-454, 000465-481, 000499-502, 000581-583,

000595-597).

Guaranties are contracts, and are subject to general

contract principles.

Thus, if a trier of fact finds that Otsuka

engaged in fraudulent conduct at the inception of the agreements,
the guaranties are voidable. The holding of Heller Western is thus
inapplicable to this case.
IV.

THE FORBEARANCE AGREEMENT IS INVALID UNDER THE UTAH SUPREME
COURT'S HOLDING IN ONG INT'L (U.S.A.) INC. V. 11TH AVENUE
CORP.
The Forbearance Agreement in this case was procured by Otsuka

without any disclosure of the misrepresentations and omissions upon
which the original lease agreements were based.

Otsuka's analysis

of the Forbearance Agreement is in error because: (1) the plain
language of the Forbearance Agreement does not purport to waive
affirmative defenses, and the court below did not so rule; (2)
pursuant

to

the

Utah

Supreme

Court's

holding

in

Ong,

the

Forbearance Agreement is ineffective to waive Guarantors' fraud
claims; and (3) Otsuka relies on cases outside this jurisdiction
which either do not support Otsuka's position or are contrary to
the law set forth by the Supreme Court in Ong.
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A.

THE FORBEARANCE AGREEMENT DID NOT AFFECT THE GUARANTORS'
DEFENSES TO OTSUKA'S CLAIMS

Contrary to Otsuka's statements, Appellee's Brief at 2 3-24,
the

Forbearance

Agreement

does

not

preclude

the

Guarantors'

affirmative defenses. See e.g. Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,
701 P.2d 795, 801 n.4 (Utah 1985) (the duty to perform a contract
in good

faith

cannot

be waived

by

either party); Hofland

v.

Gustafson. 282 P. 2d 1039 (Cal. App. 1955) (a release of claims does
not preclude the assertion of available defenses).
of

Civil

Procedure

clearly

"affirmative defense."

distinguish

a

The Utah Rules

"claim"

from

an

See Utah R. Civ. P. 8.

The Forbearance Agreement does not by its terms purport to
waive

defenses

to

enforcement

of

the

underlying

contracts.8

Further, the Judgment below specifically holds that the Forbearance
Agreement waived the Guarantors' claims, but does not state that it
waived the Guarantors' defenses to Otuska's motion for summary
judgment.

(R.001061).

Forbearance
decision

Agreement

is

While
invalid

Guarantors
in

any

contend

event

that

the

the

Qng

under

(Section IV(B) below), the defenses proffered

8

by the

The Forbearance Agreement states at 5 Q: Waiver of Claims.
Wasatch and Guarantors hereby waive and release any known or
unknown claims, causes of action, or suits f"Claims") of any kind,
character or nature whatsoever fixed or contingent, which Wasatch
or Guarantors may have or claim against 0RIX or Otsuka which may
arise out of or be connected with any acts of commission or
omission by ORIX or Otsuka existing or occurring on or prior to the
date of this Forbearance Agreement, including, without limitation,
any Claims arising with respect to the Equipment Lease, Related
Documents or the collateral or the Guaranties.
(R.000157-166
emphasis added).
14

Guarantors raised material issues of fact and precluded summary
judgment notwithstanding the Forbearance Agreement.
B.

OTSUKA MISCONSTRUES THE FACTS AND HOLDING IN ONG

Otsuka misinterprets Ong in several respects.
Brief at 28-31) .

(Appellee's

Contrary to Otsuka's contentions, Ong does not

require a "new misrepresentation" in connection with a release.
(Appellee's Brief at 2 6-27).9

Rather, the fraud in Ong under the

initial agreement and the release consisted of continuing fraud
with regard to a single assertion; i.e. the original statement that
the crypts were concrete, and a failure by the defendants to reveal
that this was not true prior to the execution of the release. Ong,
850 P. 2d at 453. At the core of the Court's decision in Ong is the
fact that the plaintiffs would not have invested in the mausoleum
in the first place had they known that the crypts were made of wood
rather

than

concrete.

Ong,

850

P. 2d

at

451.

Because

the

transaction in Ong was tainted from the beginning and the facts
remained unknown to the plaintiffs, the subsequent release, which
purported to release all existing claims of whatever source, was
ineffective to release claims of fraud.

9

Otsuka's entire argument at pp. 26-27 of Appellee's Brief,
citing Bellefonte Re-Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 757 F.2d 523
(2nd Cir. 1985) and Alleghany Corp. v. Kirbv, 333 F.2d 327 (2nd
Cir. 1964) aff'd on rehearing, 340 F.2d 311 (1965), is directly
contrary to the holding in Ong. The decision in Ong specifically
invalidated
a release made subsequent
to
the
underlying
transaction, which purported to waive an unknown claim for
fraudulent inducement of the underlying transaction.
15

Guarantors have asserted that they, like the plaintiffs in
Ong, were induced by fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions to
enter into a business deal: the defendants in Ong misrepresented
what they had, while Otsuka misrepresented its ability to provide
an Otsuka MRI, the objective of the entire transaction.10

The fact

that Wasatch agreed to accept a Siemens MRI after several months of
waiting

and

considerable

misrepresentation.
and

the

Guarantors

expenditure

does not transfigure

the

Misrepresentation and omission brought Wasatch
into

the transaction

in the

first place.

Otsuka's faulty analysis of Ong is based on the shallow argument
that since Wasatch knew it had a Siemens MRI at the time it signed
the Forbearance Agreement, it cannot assert that Otsuka engaged in
ongoing deception regarding the availability of the Otsuka MRI.
(Appellee's Brief at 29) .

Otsuka misses the point.

The claims

arise from Otsuka's inability to produce the Otsuka MRI contrary to
its representations, not because Otsuka provided a Siemens MRI in
lieu of an Otsuka MRI.11
10

Otsuka' s argument is that even if Wasatch and the Guarantors
were duped into a fake business deal, their acceptance of a
different machine and release of claims somehow validates the
original transaction. While this argument would succeed if the
Guarantors had been apprised at some point of the facts surrounding
the Otsuka MRI, the failure of Otuska to ever reveal these facts
precludes a release of fraud claims under the holding in Ong.
n

Otsuka errs in applying the exact fact situation in Ong to
the present case rather than the rule of law set forth therein.
Suppose the defendants in Ong had promised to provide concrete
crypts, and in reliance on this representation the plaintiffs
traveled from Japan and invested considerable sums in the project.
16

Otsuka also erroneously characterizes Ong as a case between
fiduciaries not bargaining at arm's length31) .

Ong

(Appellee's Brief at

in fact concerned the adversarial termination of a

business partnership:

lf

[W]hen a relationship involving partners

becomes adversarial and the partners deal at arm's length, their
fiduciary duties to one another may become extinguished."
P. 2d at 454.

Ong, 850

The Court held that despite the termination of the

partnership, the partners in Ong had a duty to reveal the facts
concealed because: (1) this information had been withheld during
the course of the partnership; and

(2) a seller has a duty to

represent fairly and accurately material elements of a transaction
when such elements are not easily ascertainable to the buyer and
materially affect the value of the property.

Id.

Otsuka disingenuously asserts that "Wasatch and the Guarantors
were obliged to take reasonable steps to inform themselves and to
protect

their

own

interests

where

the

underlying

reasonably within the knowledge of both parties."
Brief at 31) .

facts

were

(Appellee's

Like the omissions in Ong, however, all of the

information concealed was within the knowledge of Otsuka, and none
Defendants thereafter told plaintiffs they were unable to provide
the concrete crypts due to commercial impossibility, and plaintiffs
agreed to accept wooden crypts as a substitute. If defendants had
been unable to provide the concrete crypts in the first place, and
had made such representations intentionally or recklessly,
plaintiffs would not have entered into the transaction (and thus
would not have ended up with the wooden crypts) and would have a
claim for fraud.
The fraud claim is not relinquished by
plaintiffs' acceptance of the wood crypts or a subsequent release.
17

within the knowledge of or ascertainable by Guarantors,

Otsuka

fails to enlighten the Guarantors how they could have possibly
discovered: oral and written communication between Otsuka, the FDA,
and Otsuka's investigational sites; an audit conducted by the FDA
of Otsuka's Fort Collins, Colorado facility; and Otsuka's internal
decision making and thought processes, including the conclusion
that the FDA issue would cause Wasatch and the Guarantors "to
choke."12

The

FDA

issues

and

internal

decisions

were

not

ascertainable to Wasatch, and materially affected the value of the
Otsuka MRI.

Otsuka thus had a duty to disclose these issues to

Wasatch and the Guarantors pursuant to the rule set forth in Ong.
C.

OTUSKA RELIES ON CASES OUTSIDE THIS JURISDICTION WHICH
EITHER DO NOT SUPPORT OTSUKA'S ARGUMENT, OR CONTRADICT
THE LAW SET FORTH IN ONG

The cases cited by Otsuka to support its theory that a release
bars unknown claims of fraud13, Appellee's Brief at 21-27, should
be disregarded for two reasons: first, many of these cases do not
involve

the

concealment

of

facts, or

are otherwise

factually

distinguishable; and second, the cases which can be construed as
holding that a release bars unknown fraud claims are antithetic to
the principles set forth in Ong,

12

A jury could infer wrongful intent from these documents and
find that Otsuka's representations and omissions were thus either
intentionally fraudulent or made recklessly.
13

0tsuka does not cite a single Utah case for this proposition,
and the opposite principle is established in Ong, which Otsuka
misinterprets. See Section IV(B) above.
18

An examination of the following cases cited by Otsuka reveals
that these cases actually do not involve fraud claims, or are
otherwise inapplicable: Ingram Corp. v. J, 7av McDermott & Co. , 698
F.2d 1295, 1314 (5th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff failed to demonstrate
that the defendant misrepresented or concealed facts during the
release negotiations which would materially qualify those already
stated); Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 599 F.
Supp. 215, 219

(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (no party asserted fraud in the

inducement or misrepresentation at the inception of the release);
Ristau v. Wescold, Inc., 868 P.2d

1331, 1334 fn.5

(Ore. 1994)

(because plaintiff conceded that the release was not fraudulently
induced, the court specifically declined to address whether the
release barred a claim for fraud in the inducement of the release);
Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Summit Coffee Co., 858 S.W.2d 928, 933-34
(Tex. App. 1993) (release barred fraud claim because the release
and underlying agreement clearly contemplated the existence of the
undisclosed

liabilities which were the basis of fraud

claim);

Meraler v. Crystal Properties A s s o c , Ltd., 583 N.Y.S.2d 229, 233
(1st Dept. 1992) (plaintiffs were fully aware of the claims at the
time they executed the release, and there was no allegation that
defendants attempted to conceal or misrepresent the claims).

These

cases

which

differ

substantially

from

the

present

case,

in

Guarantors allege that Otsuka misrepresented and concealed facts
which materially altered the transaction, and failed to reveal the

19

true

facts

throughout

the

parties' dealings.

(R.000436-437,

000445, 000448-450) . u
The cases cited by Otsuka must be disregarded to the extent
that they conflict with the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Oner.
Although the release at issue in Ong was broad enough on its face
to release unknown fraud claims, the Court held that the release
was ineffective to release such claims based on the policy of Utah
courts "of vitiating agreements, including releases, premised on
fraud.

Accordingly, a release will be voidable

integral part of a scheme to defraud."
Cases

which

demonstrate

a

practice

14

if it was an

Ong, 850 P.2d at 453.
of

upholding

releases

Pickwick Communications, Inc. v. Weinberg, 1994 U.S. Lexis
15680 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) is also distinguishable, as defendants in
that case accepted the benefits of the written agreement containing
the release, and did not bring suit against the plaintiff, for
three years after discovering the facts constituting the alleged
fraud.
1994 Lexis at 11-13.
By contrast, Guarantors in the
present action did not learn of the FDA issues until September,
1995, seven months after Otsuka filed this lawsuit.
(R.000500,
000581, 000595).
20

notwithstanding unknown claims of fraud15 carry no weight in Utah
as they are contrary to the rule set forth in Ong.
V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Guarantors respectfully request

that this Court reverse the orders granting Otsuka's Motion for
Summary Judgment and denying Guarantors' Motion to Amend Answer and
Add Counterclaim, and remand this matter for a trial on the merits.

15

Bellefonte holds that a release bars fraud claims where the
only fraud asserted is that which also underlies the agreement
which is the subject of the release.
757 F.2d at 52 6-27.
In
Allegheny, the court held that a release barred unknown claims of
fraud, emphasizing that some of the facts underlying the fraud
claim had been revealed, that the fraud gave rise to the underlying
action, and for that fraud the defendant "paid the settlement
price." 333 F.2d at 334. Nielson v. Beck. 1994 Lexis 15180, at 15
involves a particularly harsh denial of a fraud claim which arose
contemporaneously with the release in question. These decisions
are directly contrary to the holding in Ong: that the defendants7
failure to ever disclose the fraud in the initial transaction
rendered the release void. Ong, 850 P.2d at 452-54.
Other cases cited by Otsuka make broad statements which
contradict Ong in application.
In Pickwick Communications, the
court states: "[W]e find no reason to depart from the wellestablished rule that, in interpreting a release under traditional
contract principles, we are compelled to bar claims precluded by
the plain language of the release, including allegations of fraud."
1994 Lexis at 13. Nielson v. Beck, 1994 Lexis 15180, 16 (D. Ore.)
and Ristau v. Wescold, Inc.. 868 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Ore. 1994) hold:
"[A] general release from all claims and demands is sufficient to
bar a specific claim, unless the claim is excepted from the release
agreement."
21
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